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Laws, norms, and the Institutional
Analysis and Development framework
DANIEL H. COLE
∗
Maurer School of Law and School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, USA
Abstract. Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework has been described as ‘one of the most developed and sophisticated
attempts to use institutional and stakeholder assessment in order to link theory
and practice, analysis and policy’. But not all elements in the framework are
sufficiently well developed. This paper focuses on one such element: the
‘rules-in-use’ (a.k.a. ‘rules’ or ‘working rules’). Specifically, it begins a
long-overdue conversation about relations between formal legal rules and
‘working rules’ by offering a tentative and very simple typology of relations. Type
1: Some formal legal rules equal or approximate the working rules; Type 2: Some
legal rules plus (or emended by) widely held social norms equal or approximate
the working rules; and Type 3: Some legal rules bear no evident relation to the
working rules. Several examples, including some previously used by Ostrom, are
provided to illustrate each of the three types, which can be conceived of as nodes
or ranges along a continuum. The paper concludes with a call for empirical
research, especially case studies and meta-analyses, to determine the relevant
scope of each of these types of relations, and to provide data for furthering our
understanding of how different types of rules, from various sources, function (or
not) as institutions.
1. Introduction
The Institutional Analysis andDevelopment (IAD) framework has been described
as ‘one of the most developed and sophisticated attempts to use institutional and
stakeholder assessment in order to link theory and practice, analysis and policy’
(Aligica, 2006: 89). But it suffers from notable weaknesses, including its failure
to account for the complex relations between formal legal rules and ‘rules-in-
use’ (or ‘working rules’). The purpose of this paper is to begin a process of
exploring the variable relations between legal rules and ‘working rules’ (a.k.a.,
‘rules-in-use’) to enhance the IAD framework’s utility.
The first section of this paper briefly reintroduces the IAD framework. The
second section focuses on the role of formal and informal rules in the IAD
framework. The third section offers a tentative typology of relations between
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Figure 1. Basic Components of the IAD Framework
Source: Ostrom (2005, p. 15, Fig. 1.2)
call for further (qualitative as well as quantitative) empirical research concerning
the relations between formal legal rules and ‘working rules’, including the social
and legal processes that influence or determine those relations.
2. Function and evolution of the IAD framework
Originally developed in the 1980s by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University (see
Kiser and Ostrom, 1982), the IAD framework as it stands today is the product
of several important influences. Foremost among them are the political theories
of Ostrom’s husband and partner, Vincent, whose work described many of the
framework’s elements before the first version of the IAD was constructed. A
second important influence was Elinor Ostrom’s increasing engagement with
game theory, especially during and after her semester studying with Reinhard
Selten in Bielefeld, West Germany, in 1981. It is easy to see this influence in the
very structure of the IAD (Figure 1), with actors in positions, entering into social
interactions with their own strategies (as well as ethics, ideas, and information),
and operating under sets of rules that structure social interactions. The ‘action
situation’ might as well be, and sometimes is in fact, a ‘decision node’ in an
iterated game. Just as in the theory of games, social interactions in the IAD
framework produce outcomes that affect the material welfare of the actors (and
potentially others).
The IAD framework evolved significantly over time. Figure 1 might be called
the ‘standard version’, as Ostrom used it in her most complete explication of
the framework (E. Ostrom 2005: 15) and regularly thereafter (e.g. E. Ostrom,
2010: 646). As in most versions of the IAD framework, the centrepiece is the
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action situation, which is an actual or virtual social forumwhere individuals meet
and engage with one another, establishing patterns of interaction that generate
outcomes for those individuals, as well as wider social and ecological effects.
Actors enter action situations in positions (e.g. citizen, seller, buyer, senator,
litigant, judge, etc.), withwhatever cognitive capacities, information, preferences,
strategies (conditional cooperator, rent-seeker, free-rider, etc.), they possess, all
of which are to varying degrees shaped by existing biophysical conditions, the
attributes of the community in which they live, and the ‘rules’.
In this version of the framework, Ostrom refers to the variables preceding the
action situation as ‘exogenous’. This makes sense in so far as they are external
to a given action situation. But the variables are, in fact, endogenised to the
framework by virtue of the feedback loops from the Outcomes box, as patterns
of interaction effecting biophysical conditions, community attributes and rules.
It is, perhaps, more appropriate to think of those variables as the ‘social and
ecological context’ within which a focal action situation arises.1
2. Constitutional, policy, and operational levels under the IAD framework
Among the unique features of the IAD framework is its utility across a wide range
of social settings, including markets, courtrooms, corporate boardrooms, clubs,
faculty meetings, religious synods and the family dinner table. It also works at
all levels of social choice, including: the constitutional level, where constitutional
rules are outputs that establish the meta-rules of the game; the policy-making
level,2 where laws and regulations, enacted in compliance with the constitutional
rules, are outputs that establish rules designed to affect individuals’ interactions
at the ‘operational level’. In the aggregate, the daily operational-level interactions
of individuals within or among communities establish ‘patterns of interaction’
that can affect the social-ecological context in which they occur. Indeed, choices
made at each level have outcomes (in addition to outputs) that can affect the
biophysical conditions, community attributes, and rules at other levels. Figure 2
illustrates the relations between levels of choice, rules and outcomes.
To illustrate the crosscurrents across levels of interaction, consider the case
of ‘Prohibition’, a massive but doomed effort at social engineering undertaken
in the United States between 1920 and 1933. The Eighteenth Amendment to the
US Constitution, which took effect on 16 January 1919 (subsequently amended
as of 17 January 1920), prohibited the production, transport and sale (but not
the private possession or consumption) of alcohol throughout the country. It
1 One implication of this treatment is that those boxes might be replaced by the first-tier variables of
Ostrom’s subsequently developed SES framework (see E. Ostrom, 2007, 2009).
2 I prefer the term ‘policy level’ to ‘collective choice level’, the term usually employed by Ostrom and
others using the IAD framework, because it is more specific. Constitutional-level decisions are just as
much collective-choice decisions as are lower-level policy decisions.
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Figure 2. Levels of social interaction and choice
was the outcome of a ‘constitutional action situation’ driven by a coalition of
‘Baptists and Bootleggers’ (see e.g. Yandle, 1983).
The US Constitution provides two separate sets of procedural meta-rules
(i.e. rules for establishing rules) for its own amendment: Under Article V, the
Constitution is amended when three-quarters of the states ratify a proposed
amendment enacted by two-thirds super-majorities in both houses of Congress.
Alternatively, the states can amend the Constitution without congressional
action, on their own initiative. Two-thirds of the states can call a constitutional
convention at which amendments can be adopted by simplemajority vote, subject
to ratification by three-quarters of all the states. The Eighteenth Amendment was
adopted pursuant to the first of these processes. It provided a constitutional
meta-rule establishing Prohibition, which Congress then supplemented, in a
‘policy action situation’, with the Volstead Act (Pub. L. 66–s66). That statute,
which survived a veto by President Woodrow Wilson (in accordance with
other procedural meta-rules of the game empowering Congress to override
a presidential veto upon two-thirds super-majority votes in each chamber),
added precision to the ‘rules of the game’ governing alcohol, including certain
exceptions and exemptions from the general ‘meta-rule’ established in the
Eighteenth Amendment.3
3 Congress arguably violated the constitutional meta-rules by, in effect, amending a constitutional
provision via ordinary legislation. However, it is also possible to argue that the Volstead Act merely
filled-in some gaps or offered a legislative interpretation of the Eighteenth Amendment.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000030
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Initially, compliance with Prohibition at the operational level was high
(Miron and Zwiebel, 1991), but ‘black markets’ in alcohol soon emerged (as
the ‘bootleggers’ had anticipated), enriching and empowering organised crime
‘families’, which competed with one another through the use of violence and
corruption of law enforcement. These unforeseen and unintended consequences
soon ‘led to widespread public disenchantment with Prohibition’ (Miron
and Zwiebel, 1991: 2). Alcohol consumption quickly rebounded toward
pre-Prohibition levels. Congress ultimately proposed a new constitutional
amendment to re-legalise alcohol production and sales. The Twenty-first
Amendment originated in a ‘policy action situation’ – Congress’ February 1933
enactment of the Blaine Act, which proposed to amend the Constitution to
repeal the Eighteenth Amendment. Before the year was out, three-quarters of
the states had ratified the Twenty-first Amendment (in a series of constitutional
action situations), thereby ending America’s single greatest experiment in social
engineering.
This was a case – really, a series of related action situations at constitutional,
policy, and operational levels – in which higher-level rules affected action
situations at lower levels, while feedback mechanisms, in turn, led to further
changes in the constitutional meta-rules of the game. Simply put, one
constitutional-level action situation designed to reform individual behaviour
was ultimately negated by patterns of interaction at the operational level, which
reflected powerful social norms. Problems arising at both the operational and
policy levels led to the nullification of the Eighteenth Amendment by the Twenty-
first Amendment, in another constitutional-level action situation, which changed
the meta-rules of the game to make them conform more closely to (operational-
level) social behaviour.4
It is important to understand that, in Ostrom’s terminology, the IAD is neither
a theory nor a model but a framework – a conceptual umbrella under which
various theories and models might be deployed and tested as mechanisms for
understanding, explaining or diagnosing ‘social dilemmas’ (see e.g. E. Ostrom,
2005: 27–9). The framework is not completely atheoretical, of course, but it
represents a ‘metatheoretical conceptual map’ (E. Ostrom and Cox, 2010: 455)
for understanding and assessing the most important elements, as assessed by
the social scientist acting more or less like an examining physician, in a given
collective action setting. The framework’s primary purpose is to allow social
scientists from various disciplinary backgrounds to organise their thinking in
similar ways about social interactions (both formal and informal), as well as
outcomes, prior to assessing particular cases or diagnosing specific problems.
For that purpose it is eminently useful.
4 Needless to say, the history of Prohibition presented here is simplified in order to elucidate the
cross-level effects of action situations at constitutional, policy and operational levels. For a less simplistic,
but still concise, history of Prohibition, see Menell (1969).
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Many of the IAD framework’s elements have been well developed over the
years (see, most importantly, E. Ostrom, 2005 and McGinnis, 2011a), but
Ostrom always considered its elements, definitions, and the overall structure of
the framework to be provisional and subject to contestation, further development
and even refutation. She was almost continually revising and refining the
framework and its elements. The focus of this paper is on the element labelled,
in various versions of the framework as ‘rules’ or ‘rules-in-use’.
Ostrom delineated various types of rules that condition social interactions. But
she wrote little about the sources of rule types; nor did she deeply explore how
formal legal rules influence, and are influenced by, social norms, ‘rules-in-use’
or ‘working rules’.5 In her most elaborate explication of the IAD framework,
Ostrom (2005) devotes five chapters to rules and their analysis. She is quite
careful to distinguish rule types by function, and she carefully distinguishes rules
from organisations (following North, 1990). But nowhere in those five chapters
does she discuss how formal legal rules and informal social norms, singly or
in combination, comprise ‘the rules’, ‘the working rules’ or the ‘rules-in-use’.
This is not to argue that Ostrom was unaware of distinctions between legal
rules, social norms, conventions, customs and other types of rule-systems. In
her ‘institutional grammar’, co-developed with Sue Crawford (see Crawford and
Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2005: Chapter 5), Ostrom specifically distinguished
‘rules’ from ‘norms’, arguing that rules = norms + specified sanctions. Clearly,
she understood that rules come from various sources, but her main focus
remained on rule functions rather than sources. Consequently, to this day the
IAD element labelled ‘rules’ or, more often, ‘rules-in-use’, remains something of a
black box. My purpose here is to spur a more concerted effort to understand and
delineate the roles (plural) that formal legal rules play in determining ‘working
rules’ within the IAD framework.
3. Formal laws, rule types, and the IAD framework
Roscoe Pound (1910) was the first scholar to distinguish between ‘rules-in-form’
and ‘rules-in-use’, though he preferred the terms ‘law-in-books’ and ‘law-in-
action’. Nevertheless, the term ‘rules-in-use’ is sometimes taken to imply that
‘rules-on-paper’ are irrelevant. For that reason, I prefer the label ‘working
rules’ (following Commons, 1959: 531; E. Ostrom, 2005: 19; V. Ostrom,
1976: 842), or simply ‘rules’, which are broader terms that do not implicitly or
5 Ostrom (1990) did, of course, observe cases in which competing sets of rules interacted, as
when formal (state) rule systems negated or diminished the effectiveness of informal local common-
property/regulatory systems. Ostrom (1986) attempted explicitly to connect legislative voting outcomes
and bureaucratic procedures. More generally, McGinnis (2011b: 53, 70–71) has observed that rules-in-
use are themselves outputs of other action situations. But in none of these cases was the author concerned
primarily with explicating in a general, or generalisable, way the cross-influences between formal laws
and working rules or ‘rules-in-use’.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000030
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 68.54.119.127, on 02 Mar 2017 at 02:07:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Laws, norms, and the Institutional Analysis and Development framework 7
explicitly conflict either with informal norms or formal legal rules. Among the
‘working rules’, the role of formal legal institutions has been, relatively speaking,
neglected in IAD elaborations and applications. In part, this is because many such
applications focus on local and (relatively) informal community decisions, rather
than rule making within formal legal structures. But it is important to remember
that the IAD framework is intended as a general analytical tool not limited to
local common-pool resource issues. And in many – perhaps the vast majority –
of action situations in which most actors find themselves on a daily basis, formal
legal rules are an important component of the ‘working rules’.
What a ‘rule’ is
Schlager and Ostrom (1992: 250) define ‘rules’ as ‘generally agreed-upon and
enforced prescriptions that require, forbid or permit specific actions for more
than a single individual’. This statement can usefully be decomposed into two
elements that together comprise a rule: (1) deontic specification, i.e. the rule
must specify actions that specified actors may, must, or must not perform;
and (2) levels of compliance/enforcement, i.e. the rule must be obeyed and/or
enforced to some inevitably uncertain level below which it would no longer
be considered a rule (see e.g. Elmes, 1966: 51)6 but something less, such as
a standard, guideline, recommendation, ethic, signal, expression or simply an
empty gesture. For the sake of conceptual clarity, the examples of rules provided
in this paper intentionally steer clear of the admittedly fuzzy boundaries of both
deontic specification and obeisance/enforcement.
A spectrum exists between complete non-enforcement and 100 per cent
enforcement. Presumably, no onewould require perfect enforcement as a defining
condition for a ‘rule’. For most rules, actual enforcement levels (not to mention
the socially optimal level of enforcement) is far below 100 per cent (see e.g. Cole
and Grossman, 2011 346–7). But the problem of under-enforcement is tricky. At
some point along the enforcement continuum, between perfect non-enforcement
and perfect enforcement, the actual enforcement rate could become so low that
it no longer makes sense to call the rule a ‘rule’. Just where that point lies seems
objectively indeterminate and so inherently subjective.
Formal legal rules are important for the IAD framework
Virtually all legal scholars today appreciate that formal legal rules and processes
– including court rulings, duly enacted statutes, and subsidiary regulations –
are not the only institutions that structure social relations. They have written
about the important, sometimes dominant, roles of custom (see e.g. Ehrlich
[1936] 2009: chapter 19; Smith, 2009), social norms (see e.g. Ellickson, 1991)
6 ‘The laws of the land share one great weakness with all other laws; they are not laws unless they
are enforced.’
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and ‘legal pluralism’ (see Griffiths, 1986).7 By contrast, formal legal rules are
sometimes derided as ‘dead letters’ because they are unable, by themselves,
to affect behaviour (see Kingston and Caballero, 2009); or they are said to
serve only an auxiliary function, ‘re-institutionalising’ existing customary rules
that arise in the first place from social norms or customs within organisations,
including churches, families, communities and cultures (Bohannan, 1965: 34–7).
Were that invariably the case, formal legal rules could be safely ignored without
consequence. As it happens, however, formal legal rules are very often of great
importance in understanding social interactions and individual behaviour.
Elinor Ostrom would not disagree. In fact, she regularly invoked formal
legal rules to explicate functional rule types. Formal legal mechanisms and
processes featured prominently in her works on water allocation in Southern
California, beginning with her 1965 PhD dissertation, which concerned the
role of public entrepreneurs in devising groundwater management systems in
California. Formal proceedings in state courts facilitated negotiations among
stakeholders resulting in complex interagency agreements that were designed to
ensure replenishment of groundwater supplies and prevent saltwater intrusion
(see E. Ostrom, 1965; also see V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, 1972: 8).8
Ostrom wrote a great deal about various types of rules that condition activity
in action arenas (see Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, E. Ostrom, 2005: chapters 5
and 7), but she never explained how formal laws related to the ‘working rules’.
Table 1 describes Ostrom’s rule types; and Figure 3 shows how those rules are
supposed to come into play in action situations.9
Interestingly, inUnderstanding Institutional Diversity, Ostrom (2005: chapter
7) relies almost exclusively on formal legal rules and processes to explicate the
rule types in Table 1 and Figure 3. For example, she describes ‘position rules’ by
reference to: the USConstitution’s age and citizenship conditions for membership
in Congress; rules of criminal procedure requiring arrested actors to participate
in court proceedings against them; and the general requirement to pay taxes
7 According to some legal pluralist theories, the legal academy is dominated by ‘legal centrists’ who
treat state-based legal norms as dominant. Any observer of the structure of professional legal education
would have to concur, which is not to concede, however, that state-based legal rules do not predominate
(at least in certain societies).
8 ‘The structure of incentives inherent in the law of water rights is clearly not sufficient to constitute a
variety of collective enterprises capable of increasing the supply of water services available to a community
of water users. Such users must have access to courts, legislatures and other decision-making facilities
capable of taking authoritative decisions in determining, enforcing and in altering decision-making
arrangements’.
9 I am not here arguing that Ostrom’s rule types constitute all possible rule types affecting action
situations (there may be others) or, more importantly, that her rule types are always instituted as actual
rules, under her strict definition of ‘rule’ (discussed above). It is easy to imagine, for example, that a
player’s ‘position’ in some focal action situation is determined by custom or tradition rather than ‘rule’.
Nevertheless, the various formal legal rules by which she exemplifies the rule types in Understanding
Institutional Diversity are, in fact, rules on her definition.
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Table 1. Types and functions of rules in the IAD Framework
Type of rule Function of rule
Position rules Create positions (e.g. member, judge, voter, representative) that actors may
hold.
Boundary rules Define (1) who is eligible to hold a certain position, (2) the process by which
positions are assigned to actors (including rules of succession), and (3) how
positions may be exited.
Choice rules Prescribe actions actors in positions must, must not, or may take in various
circumstances.
Aggregation rules Determine how many, and which, players must participate in a given collective-
or operational-choice decision.
Information rules Authorise channels of information flows available to participants, including
assignation of obligations, permissions, or prohibitions on communication.
Payoff rules Assign rewards or sanctions to particular actions that have been taken or based
on outcomes.
Scope rules Delimit the range of possible outcomes. In the absence of a scope rule, actors
can affect any physically possible outcomes.
Figure 3. Where Different Types of Rules Enter Action Situations
(Source: Ostrom 2005, p. 189, Fig. 7.1)
consistent with the tax code (E. Ostrom, 2005: 195–6). She illustrates ‘exit rules’
with legal term limits for some elective office holders and prisoners, and by
reference to litigants in civil justice settings who choose to settle out of court (E.
Ostrom, 2005: 198–200). ‘Aggregation rules’ are exemplified by formal adoption
and amendment processes for legislation, a task requiring the cooperation of
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000030
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 68.54.119.127, on 02 Mar 2017 at 02:07:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
10 DANIEL H. COLE
Figure 4. Relationships of formal and informal collective-choice arenas.
(Source: Ostrom 2005, p. 62, Fig. 2.4)
multiple legislators (E. Ostrom, 2005: 202). Ostrom explains ‘payoff rules’ by
reference to labour contracts. And ‘scope rules’, she illustrates by government
regulations specifying the goal to be achieved, but allowing regulated entities
discretion in how best to achieve that goal (E. Ostrom, 2005: 209). This extensive
reliance on formal legal rules to exemplify rule types suggests that, for Ostrom,
legal rules were more than just words on paper that had no effect on operational-
level interactions. Moreover, she (Ostrom, 2005: 62, Figure 2.4) also directly
related (using arrows) formal legal rules (as well as informal social norms) to
‘[o]perational rules in use’ (see Figure 4). Nevertheless, she never explained or
offered examples of processes by which those relations arise or persist.
Most tellingly, the very structure of the IAD framework, which is designed to
work at different levels of social choice, suggests that formal legal rules are often
(if not always) expected to play a significant role. The framework’s differentiation
of constitutional- and collective-level choices presupposes that the outputs of
those processes – constitutional and legal rules and regulations, respectively –
can and do affect operational-level choices (see E. Ostrom, 2005: 214–15). Thus,
the law is imbricated within the structure of the IAD framework.
Nevertheless, in the framework itself, formal legal rules appear only as generic
‘rules’, or more often in the somewhat loaded phrase, ‘rules-in-use’, which is
often used (though not by Ostrom herself) in a way that denigrates formal legal
rules. So, the question remains, by what process(es) and to what extent are
formal legal rules translated or converted into ‘rules-in-use’ (or ‘working rules’)?
This is decidedly not a question about formal institutions (laws) versus informal
institutions (social norms) (see North, 1990: 3) but of how rules of any kind
are understood, given effect, or operationalised within a given community. That
process of translation or ‘mobilisation’ itself undoubtedly involves ‘patterns of
interaction’ observed across potentially numerous and diverse action situations.
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137417000030
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4. A simple typology of relations between formal laws and ‘working rules’
Relations between formal legal rules and ‘working rules’, as well as those between
formal legal rules and informal social norms (on which see e.g. Brennan et
al., 2013; Hart, 1961; Posner, 2000), are more complex and multidirectional
than often is supposed. Institutionalists, both ‘old’ (or ‘classical’) and ‘new’,
appreciate that monitoring, enforcement and sanctions are critical components
of successful collective action, including for common-property management of
common-pool resources, as evidenced inOstrom’s ‘design principles’ (E. Ostrom,
1990: 90, Table 3.1). Less well appreciated is that monitoring, enforcement and
sanctioning regimes are themselves complex adaptive systems, so that relations
between formal laws and rules-in-use cannot be explained simply by a casual
reference to monitoring, enforcement and sanctioning. Rather, analysts must
dig into the actual monitoring, enforcement and sanctioning institutions and
organisations of specific cases to learn whether, and to what extent, legal rules
influence or determine the ‘working rules’.
This section offers a simple three-part typology of relations between formal
legal rules and ‘working rules’: (1) the formal legal rule is the ‘working rule’ (2)
the formal legal rule significantly influences the ‘working rule’ (and sometimes
vice versa), and (3) the formal legal rule bears no apparent relation to the
‘working rule’. To illustrate each of these categories, I adapt several of the
examples Ostrom (2005: chapter 7) used to illustrate different rule types that
affect action situations.
Type 1. Some legal rules  10working rules
Some legal rules are so clear and controlling (within the relevant community)
that they require virtually no interpretation or conversion (via implementation)
into working rules. Ostrom (2005: 195) exemplifies the notion of ‘boundary
rules’, for example, by referring to age requirements or term limits for certain
political officeholders. It is difficult to imagine a plausible theory of constitutional
interpretation under which the rule that an individual must be at least 35 years
old to serve as president of the United States might be interpreted to allow a 30-
year-old individual to serve in that position. Technically, the constitutional rule
is not self-enforcing – we can imagine a case where judicial enforcement of the
rule is required – but it is so close to being self-enforcing in practice that it might
be said to serve as both the formal rule and the working rule (or ‘rule-in-use’).
Similarly, standard weights and measures, although they must be enforced
from time to time against non-compliers, constitute the working rules.11 No act
10 The mathematical symbol ‘’ means ‘approximates’ or ‘nearly equals’.
11 It is worth observing, in this context, that rules establishing standard weights and measures not
only structure human interactions over goods, but are themselves public goods, in the strict sense of
the term. Once they are established (and they only have to be established once), standard weights and
measures are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption.
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of interpretation is necessary to understand rules ranging from established time
zones, rules of the road requiring drivers to use the left (or right) side of the road,
the designation of the length of a mile or kilometre, setting the weight of one
ton or the volume of a litre. Individuals quickly learn to organise their activities
around such rules and become habituated to them, almost as if they were part
and parcel of their thought processes. These working rules are exactly the same
as the formally institutionalised legal rules.
Many (but not all) rules in sports and games are also of this nature. In football
(known as soccer among Americans), the entire ball must cross the entire goal
line for a goal to be scored. There certainly are close calls in which it is difficult
to determine whether a goal has in fact been scored (a problem diminished by
improved goal-line technology). But such factual issues do not alter the relation
between the formal rule and the working rule, which is one of identity. The rule
is enforced as written, even in cases where its enforcement is difficult and/or
contestable.
It might be objected that all the examples cited are relative rarities among
all of the working rules in the world. That, however, is an empirical question
that has hardly been raised, let alone studied systematically. Moreover, some
of the rules listed above – certainly rules of the road and standard weights and
measures – are among the most important rules in modern commercial societies.
Type 2. Some legal rules + widely held social norms  working rules
Some legal rules that could be working rules if strictly enforced (like those in the
preceding section) are not coextensive with the working rules because they are
publicly known not to be strictly enforced and a prevalent social norm exists that,
in effect, translates the formal legal rule into a different but related working rule.
A prime example here, to which Ostrom sometimes referred (see e.g. E. Ostrom,
2005: 18), is the speed limit for motor vehicles on public highways. Posted
speed limits represent the formal legal rules, and some motorists follow them
strictly. But most motorists understand that enforcement is costly (and therefore
imperfect) and that law enforcers are unlikely to pull them over unless they
exceed the posted speed limit by a substantial amount. So, they follow an almost
universal (at least in the United States) social norm of driving approximately five
miles per hour above the posted limit (in good driving conditions).
Notice that the norm itself tells us nothing about the actual speed anyone is
likely to drive on a given road – the working rule – unless we also know the
posted (formal legal) speed limit. Moreover, motorists know that reliance on the
working rule is not foolproof. Should a highway patrol officer choose to ticket a
driver for exceeding the posted speed limit by only three miles per hour, a court
of law will strictly enforce that decision, regardless of the prevailing social norm.
The result would no doubt strike the unfortunate motorist as grossly unfair, but
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in case of conflict the formal legal rule would trump the working rule.12 The
bottom line is that, even if the working rule is not completely determined by the
law-in-form (i.e. the posted speed limit), the formal legal rule plays an important
role in determining the working rule.
To take another example from the sport of soccer, a rule-in-form provides that
when a player from one team kicks the ball over the touchline, the other team
takes possession of the ball for a ‘throw in’. In some circumstances, that formal
rule simply is the working rule. But in certain well-understood circumstances, the
formal rule is modified by a social norm (based on a notion of fairness or equity).
So, if a player from Team A is injured on the field, and Team B kicks the ball out
of play so that player can receive treatment, Team A obtains possession of the
ball pursuant to the formal rule. However, in accordance with the social norm,
Team A returns the ball to the possession of Team B as soon as play resumes.
This situation might be viewed as an instantiation of Aristotle’s injunction that
general rules of law must be tempered by equity in order to do justice given
the specific facts of individual cases (Aristotle, 1941, NE, Book V, Chapter 10,
§1137b12–27).
Howmany cases are of this type, in which the working rule combines a formal
legal rule with some informal social norm(s)? Once again, that is an empirical
question requiring further investigation. No basis exists for presuming that this
category is insubstantial. To the contrary, this category might well prove the
largest.
Type 3. Some formal legal rules 13working rules
Some subset of legal institutions play no significant role in the organisation of
social behaviour because they simply do not affect social interactions; indeed,
some of them are not even intended to do so, being in the nature of precatory or
symbolic acts. An example would be a law establishing an official state bird or
tree.
In other cases, laws that are intended to have an impact on social behaviour
simply fail, as we saw earlier with the case of Prohibition in the United States.
Robert Ellickson’s (1991) famous book, Order without Law, presents another
well-known case in point. California state law generally required cattle ranchers
to ‘fence in’ their cattle, in order to prevent them from damaging neighbouring
properties or wandering onto public highways. But Shasta County, by special
exemption, was allowed to adopt a bifurcated rule. Cattle ranchers in some parts
of the county were subject to the general state law of ‘fencing in’. But in other
12 There are of course special cases, such as where a motorist might bribe the police officer to avoid
enforcement of the speed limit (whether the formal limit or the normal limit), but I am writing here about
generalities, not special cases. Where bribery is not a special case but reflects, instead, a regular ‘pattern
of interaction’, that obviously implies that the rules-in-form are related only in a more attenuated way (if
at all) to the working rules.
13 The mathematical symbol ‘’ means ‘is not an element of (or in)’.
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sections of the county cattle ranchers could let their cattle roam free. In those
sections, if a neighbour wanted to avoid property damage fromwandering cattle,
she had to ‘fence out’ the cattle. Obviously, these alternative rules were about
cost allocation between cattle ranchers and their neighbours. Under a legal rule
of ‘fencing in’, the cattle rancher bears the costs; under the rule of ‘fencing out’,
neighbouring landowners bear the cost.
What Ellickson discovered when he went to Shasta County to conduct
empirical research was that virtually no one abided by either of the alternative
legal rules. In fact, they did not know the legal rules and, somewhat more
surprisingly, neither did local lawyers who were sometimes called upon to help
resolve disputes. However, in most cases disputes did not arise or did not long
persist because local residents (with a few notable exceptions)14 – including
cattle ranchers, crop farmers, and others – operated under a strong social norm
of neighbourliness, according to which neighbours cooperated, sharing the costs
of fencing cattle out or in.
In Ellickson’s case, a strong and effective social norm obviated and displaced
the formal legal rules adopted by the county (pursuant to state law). But how
generalisable is Ellickson’s case? In the absence of many similar studies, we
cannot even conduct a meta-analysis to help us answer that question. What we
require is a great deal more empirical research. In the absence of that research, we
cannot reliably conclude that strong social norms are generally more important
or more influential than formal legal rules.
Just as importantly, the supposed dichotomy of social norms versus laws
might generally be the wrong way to think about relations between those two
categories of institutions.15 As already established, formal laws often influence
or even determine working rules. At the same time, it is clear that social norms
often influence the substance of formal laws. So, for example, the unofficial
norms regarding water use adopted by miners during the California gold rush
(1850s) were subsequently recognised in courts of law (Hicks v. Bell, 3 Cal 219
(1853); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal 140 (1855)), then codified into state law (Civil
Code of the State of California 268–70 (1872)), and ultimately constitutionalised
(see Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of
California 482 (1880)).
In the somewhat similar context of irrigation rules, Insa Theesfeld (2004:
253) finds a dynamic relationship between formal rules and ‘rules-in-use’ that,
sometimes at least, can lead to an ever-increasing reduction in the relevance of
14 Some outliers existed, but they were dealt with, usually to good effect, by social sanctions, including
as a last resort ostracism.
15 Brennan et al. (2013: 51), for example, distinguish formal and non-formal norms along dimensions,
including (1) the mechanisms by which they are created, (2) the mechanisms by which they are enforced,
(3) de re v. de dicto ‘normative attitudes’, and (4) effects on actions versus effects on actions, attitudes
and modes of deliberation.
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the formal rules, followed eventually by their eventual replacement with new
formal rules:
First, rules-in-use pave the way for opportunistic strategies. The opportunistic
strategies in turn change the rule-in-use, and the incongruity between formal
and effective rules increases. Because of the higher incongruity, possibilities for
opportunistic strategies increase once again. Second, opportunistic strategies
appear and, in response, a certain rule-in-use develops. This effective rule
is not congruent with the formal rule. The incongruity increases and the
possibilities for opportunistic strategies increase once again. Finally, in the long
run, growing incongruity enables a feedback that influences the development
of the formal rules.
Theesfeld’s account of how ‘opportunistic strategies’ alter ‘rules-in-use’ and,
ultimately, formal rules is, once again, congruent with the history of Prohibition
in the United States. Moreover, the kind of strategic opportunism highlighted
in her treatment of formal rules and ‘rules-in-use’ is very much present in the
IAD framework’s ‘Community Attributes’ box (see Figure 1). Actors enter into
action situations in various positions (citizen, corporate CEO, lobbyist, fund-
raiser, legislator, law enforcer, judge, etc.), possessing whatever powers and
strategies. The implication, as I suggested earlier, is that the various processes
by which formal rules are transformed into working rules are themselves action
situations, including law enforcement and other action situations in which legal
rules are evaluated and/or interpreted. It is the ‘pattern of interactions’ resulting
from those situations that ultimately determines (1) what the working rules are
(2) whether those rules deviate significantly from the formal rules, and (3) the
extent of any such deviation. Importantly, Theesfeld (2004) does not presume a
high level of ‘incongruity’ between formal rules and ‘rules-in-use’. That is, after
all, an empirical question.
When a particular legal rule appears to have no bearing on a particular
working rule, we should not assume that the working rule is superior or more
desirable. Some social norms are inefficient, morally abhorrent, resistant to
change16 or all of the above. After the US Civil War, social norms of racism
gave rise to state laws that perpetuated the oppression of former slaves, despite
their supposedly superior constitutional rights under the newly enacted and
ratified Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. Indeed,
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause went virtually unenforced
before the turn of the twentieth century, and the last vestiges of official ‘JimCrow’
were not extirpated in the southern United States until passage of the Civil Rights
Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965 (see generally Woodward [1955]
2002, Ackerman 2014).17
16 Leach and Lowndes (2007: 186) observe that ‘informal rules may prove especially tenacious and
resistant to change, existing in parallel – or even direct contradiction – to formal rules’.
17 Unofficial vestiges of ‘Jim Crow’ persist to the present day (see e.g. Bodo, 2011).
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In the case of civil rights for African Americans, the deplorable social norms
were so powerful that they could not simply or easily be displaced even by a
strong constitutional rule with inconsistent and ineffectual federal enforcement
efforts. Eventually, over a long period of time, they were eroded (but still not
eradicated) by a combination of: legal processes, including court decisions like
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954); policy decisions, for instance
racial integration of the military in 1948 by Executive Order of the President;18 as
well as less formal political and social pressures. This goes to show that, in some
cases at least, ‘opportunistic strategies’ of opposition may prevail for some time
but ultimately be subdued by consistent enforcement of countervailing formal
legal rules.
Even in less politically divisive circumstances of incremental law reform,
changes in formal rules are often ‘filtered’ by those charged with implementing
or carrying out the reforms. The result can be institutional changes that are
‘differentially interpreted, mediated and (in some cases) neutralized’ (Lowndes
and Leach, 2004: 559). Thus, in a series of case studies of implementation of
the UK’s Local Government Act of 2000, Lowndes and Leach (2004) found
that local government authorities overwhelmingly implemented the reform law
in ways that minimised the total amount of change.
The three types of relations between formal legal rules and ‘working rules’
described in this paper can be conceived as ranges along a continuum, with Type
1 and Type 3 at either end and Type 2 in the middle. The problem, of course, is
that such a stylised continuum gives us no real clue as to the actual roles that each
of the three types of relations between formal rules and working rules play in
real-world action situations. For that, we require multiple empirical studies and
meta-analyses of cases involving each type of relation. It is simply not enough to
extrapolate from a few discrete cases that formal legal rules are all that matter,
are part of what matters, or that they do not matter at all.
5. Conclusion
Perhaps because Elinor Ostrom most often used the IAD framework to study
small-scale communities that successfully established working rules to self-
govern local common-pool resources, she did not spend much time studying how
and to what extent formal legal rules influence ‘rules-in-use’.19 But she intended
the IAD as a general framework for diagnosing and possibly predicting collective
action, including in dynamic settings. It was not designed only to diagnose local
18 Executive Order 9981, 3 CFR 722 (1948).
19 She did, however, observe cases where ‘formal rules’ prevented effective management of local
common-pool resources by delegating insufficient authority to local users (see e.g. E. Ostrom, 1995: 39).
Even then, it was not the existence of formal rules per se that was the problem.
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common-pool resource issues, where formal legal rules might be expected to play
a limited role.
Even in local common-property regimes, rules often are codified and more or
less formal mechanisms established for monitoring and enforcing compliance.
When a group of fishers establishes a common-property regime along with rules
regulating who can fish where and when, those rules often are formalised in
writing and supported by other institutions for monitoring, enforcement and
sanctioning (see e.g. Berkes, 1986). Many local fisheries’ management schemes
are highly sophisticated – much more like formal legal rules or corporate bylaws
than informal social norms.
The clearest evidence that Ostrom expected formal legal rules to play a
significant role in IAD settings comes from the framework itself, which she
employed at constitutional and policy levels of collective choice, where formal
rules (and meta-rules) come from. And, when she parsed different kinds of ‘rules-
in-use’ in her most in-depth treatment of the IAD framework in Understanding
Institutional Diversity, she relied almost exclusively on formal legal rules to
exemplify them.
Given all that, it seems that formal legal rules should play a more substantial
role in studies employing the IAD framework than they have done so far. Case
studies and meta-analyses, especially those focusing beyond small, localised
groups of resource users, would benefit from attending more carefully to how
often, how many, and simply how various types of formal rules are constituted
in action situations and, in turn, how those formal rules interact with informal
norms to influence (or not) patterns and outcomes at collective-choice or
operational levels of interaction. Such investigations would open up the black
box of ‘rules’ in the IAD framework, allowing potentially further decomposition
of variables and more finely grained analyses.
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